

# **The Impact of Organizational Culture on Information Sharing**

**A Monograph  
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## **Abstract**

The Impact of Organizational Culture on Information Sharing by MAJ Virginia L. Egli,  
Wisconsin Army National Guard, 46 pages.

A key factor in the failure of the intelligence community is the resistance to information sharing. Organizational culture is an essential link in understanding the resistance to information sharing. Using Edgar Schein's organizational culture model, this paper analyzes the organizational culture of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an eye toward how organizational cultures of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau impact information sharing.

The Department of Homeland Security must identify, understand, and work through the barriers of organizational cultures within the intelligence community. Part of creating a culture of information sharing involves changing the way people value information sharing and collaboration by encouraging behaviors that foster sharing and discouraging those that do not. The Department of Homeland Security lacks several key characteristics in building an organizational culture such as a stable membership and shared history. The Department of Homeland Security is a newly structured organization with multiple agencies and departments with diverse missions. The creation of a unified organizational culture within the Department of Homeland Security will take time to develop because of the magnitude and complexity of the organization.

In comparison, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was established in 1908 as a law enforcement-centric organization. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Director, Robert Mueller, changed the organization to threat-based and intelligence driven organization after the events of 9/11. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has maintained its organizational culture while undertaking reorganization.

The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have an opportunity to bridge the information sharing gap through the development of joint threat assessments. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security have some similarities in their missions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has experience in developing threat assessments and the Department of Homeland Security is required to produce threat assessments. The Federal Bureau of Investigation offers an opportunity to teach and mentor members of the Department of Homeland Security in intelligence functions. If the organizations shared their resources and pooled their knowledge, information would become more transparent.

## Table of Contents

Introduction .....	1
Organizational Culture .....	2
Information Sharing Directives .....	11
Department of Homeland Security's Organizational Culture .....	17
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Organizational Culture .....	28
Comparing Organizational Cultures .....	38
Conclusions and Recommendations .....	42
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	44

## Introduction

“A society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members.”<sup>1</sup>

Ward Goodenough

Culture is constantly reenacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by our own behavior.<sup>2</sup> Culture supplies us our language, and language provides meaning in our day-to-day life.<sup>3</sup> Organizational culture is an essential link in understanding resistance to information sharing. The intelligence community has several different organizational cultures within its multiple agencies that act as barriers to information sharing. How does organizational culture impact information sharing?

A key factor in the failure of the intelligence community is the resistance to information sharing. As the 9 /11 Commission Report states, “the biggest impediment to all-source analysis, to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots, is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”<sup>4</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report recommended a new, government-wide approach to information sharing. In response to this call for a government-wide approach, the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to ensure the security of the United States. This paper analyzes the organizational culture of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an eye toward how the organizational cultures of the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation impact information sharing.

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<sup>1</sup>Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>4</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report, *Final Report of the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004): 433.

Section I describes organizational culture and Edgar Schein's organizational culture model. The organizational culture model provides a framework to apply an analysis of two federal agencies within the intelligence community. Section II reviews the information sharing directives for the intelligence community. The information sharing directives provide the legal framework to identify gaps and promote a strategic, unified direction for the intelligence community. Section III provides background and analysis of the Department of Homeland Security's organizational culture. The Department of Homeland Security will provide insight into the organizational culture of a newly organized agency within the intelligence community. Section IV provides background and analysis of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's organizational culture. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is a long-standing member of the intelligence community and has a mature organizational culture. Section V analyzes how these two cultures impact the information sharing between the two organizations. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's are members of the intelligence community. Both organizations are responsible for prevention of terrorism and the security of the citizens of the United States. The sharing of information between these two organizations is vital to both of their missions and their success is dependent upon seamless transmissions of information. The last section provides recommendations for further analysis of organizational culture in the intelligence community.

## **Organizational Culture**

Culture is the framework by which we view the world around us. This learned and shared behavior explains how human beings interact within a community, no matter how large or small.<sup>5</sup> Culture also impacts how individuals will act or react to new situations or information as they view it in the context of what they already know. Understanding organizational culture will aid

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<sup>5</sup> William A. Haviland, Dana Walrath, Harold E.L. Prins and Bunny McBride, *Cultural Anthropology: The Human Challenge, Twelfth Edition* (Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 2008), 26.

in identifying the underlying causes for resistance to information sharing. According to Schein, organizational learning, development, and planned change cannot be understood without considering culture as a primary source of resistance to change.<sup>6</sup>

Organizational culture is the field of organizational studies and management which includes psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs, and values (personal and cultural values) of an organization. Charles Hill and Gareth Jones define organizational culture as "the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization."<sup>7</sup> Organizational values, also known as "beliefs and ideas about what kinds of goals members of an organization should pursue and ideas about the appropriate kinds or standards of behavior organizational members should use to achieve these goals."<sup>8</sup> From organizational values come "organizational norms, guidelines, or expectations that prescribe appropriate kinds of behavior by employees in particular situations and control the behavior of organizational members towards one another."<sup>9</sup> Edgar Schein defines culture of a group as:

"A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relations to those problems."<sup>10</sup>

The categories of culture are the different types of culture. According to Schein, the four interconnected categories of culture are macro cultures, organizational cultures, subcultures, and micro cultures. Macro culture relates to nations, ethnic and religious groups, and occupations that exist within global cultures. Even cultures that are at a macro culture level may have a subculture

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<sup>6</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, xiv.

<sup>7</sup> Charles W.L. Hill and Gareth R. Jones, *Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach*, 9<sup>th</sup> Edition (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009), 394.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 394.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 12.



in its organizations. For example, medicine has its own subculture as an occupation; however, medicine can also bridge cultures across nations. Subcultures are those cultures within a larger organizational culture that take on their own identity. Micro cultures are micro systems within and outside the organization.<sup>11</sup> An example of a micro culture is fusion centers an organization focusing on intelligence and analysis of certain tasks or threats.<sup>12</sup>

Leadership is a key to organizational culture. The importance of culture in any organization is that culture is connected directly to leadership. The leader impacts the culture in the development of shared basic assumptions of the group through the external adaptation and internal integration of problem solving.

The four characteristics of culture are structural stability, depth, breadth, and patterning or integrations.<sup>13</sup> Stability in organizational culture means that its membership is firmly established. A group identity is a key component to culture and implies some level of group stability through its identity. The depth of an organizational culture is the level at which members of the organization intrinsically know how to behave within their culture. Culture is not superficial in nature; it is deeper and entrenched into the group. The breadth of the group involves how the culture permeates and influences how the organization functions to reach its goals within its various environments. Patterning or integration of organizational culture is how human beings make order or sense of their environment. Culture implies that ritual, climates, values, and behaviors tie together into a coherent whole, and this pattern or integration is the essence of culture.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>12</sup> Special Agent Chase H. Boardman, "Organizational Culture Challenges to Interagency Intelligence Community Communication and Interaction" (Norfolk: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006), 38.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 17.

Social learning and the socialization process are the content of organizational culture.<sup>15</sup> Group social learning is about survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment as well as internal integration that permits daily function and the ability to adapt and learn.<sup>16</sup> A group that has a stable membership and a shared history of learning will develop some level of culture. However, a group that has had a great deal of turnover of members and leaders or lacks a history of challenging events may lack shared basic assumptions.<sup>17</sup>

Every organization has a unique culture that is defined partly by its members and partly by its structure, history and policies. For that culture to endure, it must be transmitted from current members to new members. This process, known as organizational socialization, is especially important in organizations with strong, insular cultures, as those with weak cultures have less to transmit and will tend to experience culture changes as members come and go.

Socialization is the process of learning the ropes, training; and becoming formally and informally acquainted with what is actually of value within the organization. Formal and informal socialization are types of control mechanism for maintaining the norms, or status quo, within any organization.<sup>18</sup>

The intelligence community is a product of social learning made up of a variety of disciplines, each with its own methods of analyzing data. The preparation of an intelligence analyst comes mostly from experience gained on the job, with some limited institutional training on specific processes such as the “intelligence cycle.” The intelligence cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for policymakers to use in decision making and consists of planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination.<sup>19</sup> Intelligence analysts are trained on the intelligence cycle but use their own analytic methods and tools from their domain to analyze and solve intelligence problems. When

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 18.


<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>19</sup> Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/facttell/intcycle.htm> (accessed March 28, 2010).

interdisciplinary problems arise, the organizational response is that a variety of analytic methods are employed, resulting in a “best fit” synthesis.<sup>20</sup>

In order to further refine the concept of culture, there is a need to explain the levels of analyzing culture. Schein defined the different levels of culture by the degree in which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer.<sup>21</sup> The three major levels of cultural analysis according to Edgar Schein are artifacts, espoused values, and basic assumptions.<sup>22</sup> The levels range from the very tangible overt manifestations that can be seen and felt to the deeply embedded, unconscious, basic assumptions that are the “essence of culture.”<sup>23</sup> Figure 1 illustrates the flow between the different levels of culture, which flow from top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top.



**Figure 1. Edgar Schein’s Three Levels of Culture<sup>24</sup>**

The first level of culture is artifacts. Artifacts include those things that can be seen, heard, and felt when interacting with a new group. Some of the artifacts may include the physical environment, its language, technology, attire, manners, emotions, mission statement (vision and

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<sup>20</sup> Rob Johnston, “Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study”(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 5.

<sup>21</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 23.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 6.

values), myths, and stories told about the organization, rituals, and/or ceremonies.<sup>25</sup> Observed behavior is an artifact, to include the organizational processes that make behavior routine.<sup>26</sup> For example, structural elements such as description of the function of the organization and organizational charts are artifacts.<sup>27</sup> This level of culture is easy to observe but very difficult to interpret. In the military, service members can distinguish themselves from each other by the uniform they wear. However, the uniform for a new service member means something very different than a veteran service member. A new service member is indoctrinated to understand the true meaning of the uniform until the service member has been in the organization and learns the value of the uniform.

There is some danger in using artifacts as a tool for understanding organizational culture. Artifacts alone should not be used to explain or infer a deeper understanding of the organization. Artifacts can be used as an indicator for further investigation of the organizational culture at a deeper level. An observer of artifacts can potentially misinterpret the actual meaning behind the observed artifact without the appropriate context given by the people within the organization. Edgar Schein notes, “For example, when you see a very informal, loose organization, you may interpret that as ‘inefficient’ based on the observer’s background that informality means playing around and not working.” Conversely, this may be the manner in which the organization displays creativity and empowerment of its employees. An observer needs to be careful not to confuse artifacts with basic assumptions.

The second level of organizational culture is espoused values, which reflect a large part of group learning. All group learning reflects someone’s original beliefs and values.<sup>28</sup> In a hierarchical organization, the group leader establishes values and goals for the organization and

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<sup>25</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 23.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 25.

has an expectation that managers and supervisors will adhere to those values and obtain the organizational goals. Espoused values predict well enough what people will say in a variety of situations but may be out-of-line with what they will actually do in situations where those values should, in fact be operating.<sup>29</sup> Group learning can lead to a shared value or beliefs and eventually into a shared assumption. However, it is important to understand how this process works and where in the process the leader and groups begin to create their organizational culture. It is important to understand the process because the process creates an opportunity to change an organizational culture. Because group learning is a reflection of an original belief and/or value, the group has not yet adopted or integrated those beliefs or values as the organization's values until there is an outcome of their action. The group has not yet validated and internalized the belief and/or value as part of the organizational culture.

For example, the concept of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) is an example of an espoused value. A TTP is a standard and detailed course of action that describes how to perform a task.<sup>30</sup> A TTP is developed through group learning in response to a known and adaptive adversary. Initially, doctrine may be used but as the leaders conduct operations on the ground and interact with the adversary, they begin to understand and interpret the situation. Once the leader has an understanding of the environment, the leader will try a new method of defeating the adversary. The forces the leader uses to defeat the adversary have a known set of procedures; however, the leader develops a new solution to the problem. The new solution initially is viewed by the leader's forces as what the leader wants. Once the forces implement the new solution and it is successful, the leader's solution becomes valid. Through the process of several iterations of trial and error, eventually the concept of a TTP develops and transforms into doctrine. However, in some cases, the beliefs and values do not transform because the solution proves to be

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<sup>29</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 21.

<sup>30</sup> FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.:TRADOC, 2004), 1-151.

unreliable. In analyzing espoused values, Edgar Schein cautions practitioners to discriminate carefully as espoused values “leave large areas of behavior unexplained, leaving us with a feeling that we understand a piece of the culture but still do not have the culture as such in hand.”<sup>31</sup>

The third and deepest level of culture is basic assumptions. Schein states, “When a solution to a problem works repeatedly, it comes to be taken for granted.”<sup>32</sup> If a basic assumption is strongly held in a group, members find behavior based on any other premise inconceivable.<sup>33</sup> Basic assumptions tell an organization what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in various kinds of situations.<sup>34</sup> Basic assumptions are at the root of organizational culture. Organizational culture gives members a “set of rules” to navigate within the group. This set of rules tells the members who they are, how to behave toward each other and how to feel good about themselves.<sup>35</sup> These sets of rules become basic assumptions and build the foundation that the members of an organization need to function.

Whereas tactics, techniques, and procedures are espoused values, doctrine is an underlying basic assumption. For example, the military has a set of fundamental principles based on theory that guides its actions in support of national objectives.<sup>36</sup> The set of fundamental principles is called doctrine. Doctrine is a common understanding among and between services and coalition partners in how to respond to a military problem. The fundamental principles of doctrine are deeply embedded in the military organization. The members of the organization are trained and educated using doctrine. Members are taught how to respond in particular circumstances to a particular situation. The Global War on Terrorism tested the Army’s doctrine

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<sup>31</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition , 27.

<sup>32</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* , 21.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition , 29.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.:TRADOC, 2004), 1-65.

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Members trained in conventional doctrine found it difficult to shift to non conventional doctrine and the use of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

A deeper understanding of basic assumption is the importance of psychological effects of organizational culture. According to Schein, “the human mind needs cognitive stability.”<sup>37</sup> Members become defensive and anxious when a basic assumption is challenged because the members have learned to function in accordance with the organization’s defined values.

As Edgar Schein noted,

As leaders who are trying to get our organizations to become more effective in the face of severe environmental pressures, we are sometimes amazed at the degree to which individuals and groups in the organizations will continue to behave in obviously ineffective ways, often threatening the very survival of the organization.<sup>38</sup>

Leaders need to understand the significance of unconscious assumptions about human nature, and need to be cognizant that their own experiences can be reflected in the way they manage the organization. For example, a leader finds an employee sitting idle at his desk. The leader perceives the employee as “loafing” rather than “thinking about an important problem.”<sup>39</sup> The leader will shape the organizational culture to reflect his biases and the members will “eventually behave according to those assumptions to make their world stable and predictable.”<sup>40</sup>

Edgar Schein’s model focuses heavily on observation, group interviews, and focused inquiry with informants. Although direct observations of the organizational culture of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security for this paper are limited, interviews with Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and analysts, Department of Homeland Security management and analysts, and congressional reports about the Federal Bureau of

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<sup>37</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition , 29.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security provide the necessary data for analysis of the two organizational cultures.

## **Information Sharing Directives**

As an approach to government-wide sharing of information, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created a new position – the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center.<sup>41</sup> The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is the chief intelligence advisor to the President and, as head of the intelligence community, ensures closer coordination and integration. The Director of National Intelligence is responsible for the National Intelligence Program and has significant authority over personnel policy. In a larger sense, the creation of the Director of National Intelligence allows one person to observe the wider American Intelligence Community, identify gaps, and promote a strategic, unified direction.<sup>42</sup>

The United States Intelligence Community is a coalition of seventeen agencies and organizations within the Executive branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities. Its primary mission is to collect and convey the essential information the President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and military communities require while executing their appointed duties.<sup>43</sup> The Office of the Director of National Intelligence policy has continued the transformation of information sharing by implementing Intelligence Community Directive 501, “Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information.” This directive mandates wide ranging actions to enable information sharing, including the ability to discover and request information from all intelligence community elements, who now have a “responsibility to

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<sup>41</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002). The intelligence community was reorganized due to criticism from the 9/11 Commission.

<sup>42</sup> Intelligence.gov, <http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community> (accessed November 3, 2010).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.



provide” such information. The implementation of the Intelligence Information Sharing Dispute Resolution process, formulated to simplify and streamline information sharing, has also produced positive results.<sup>44</sup>

The National Counterterrorism Center was specifically established in 2004 (replacing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center) to bring together all available information on terrorism, analyze the information, and provide warning of potential attacks on the United States. The National Counterterrorism Center is also responsible for ensuring both the sharing of information and for all-source analysis of terrorist issues.<sup>45</sup> The Center is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and draws experts from the Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Defense.

Regardless of the laws and agencies put in place since 9/11 to create an information sharing environment within government agencies, the Fort Hood shooting and the attempted bombings on Christmas Day and in Times Square, highlight challenges, successes, and gaps in our ability to effectively share and access information.<sup>46</sup> The United States has taken great strides in the sharing of and access to information across organizational boundaries and mission domains. The government reports from the Fort Hood Shooting and bombings on Christmas Day and in Times Square indicate that there continues to be a lack of information sharing.

A special report by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs presents the lessons from the U.S. Government’s failure to prevent the Fort Hood attack. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. citizen, is accused of killing thirteen and wounding

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<sup>44</sup> Dennis C. Blair and Michael E. Leiter, *Intelligence Reform: The Lessons and Implications of the Christmas Day Attack* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2010), 5.

<sup>45</sup> Richard A. Best, Jr. “The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1.

<sup>46</sup> Information Sharing Environment (Washington, D.C.: Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 2010), v.

thirty-two Department of Defense employees at the Deployment Center in Fort Hood, Texas.<sup>47</sup> Although neither the Department of Defense nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation had specific information of the time, place, or nature of the attack, the agencies had sufficient information to have been concerned about Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist extremism and failed both to understand and to act upon the information.<sup>48</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation had flagged Hasan. The San Diego Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) was concerned because Hasan was affiliated with the U.S. military and sought a suspected terrorist's opinion. The San Diego JTTF conducted an initial investigation that revealed Hasan was a "comm. officer." The investigator understood "comm. officer" to mean communications officer not commissioned officer.<sup>49</sup> The San Diego JTTF decided to keep Hasan's communications internal to the JTTF structure and sent a detailed memorandum to the Washington, D.C. JTTF. Seven weeks after the initial memorandum was sent the Washington, D.C. JTTF assigned the lead to a detailee from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service is not a counterintelligence or counterterrorism agency, but a law enforcement arm of the Department of Defense's Office of Inspector General.<sup>50</sup> The detailee's investigation included research in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's database to determine whether Hasan had any prior counterterrorism or other investigations and officer evaluation reports.<sup>51</sup> Based upon information in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's database and officer evaluation reports that praised Hasan's studies concerning violent Islamist extremism, the detailee concluded Hasan's communications were legitimate research. The detailee considered interviewing Hasan's supervisors and colleagues but did not for two reasons: there was an ongoing investigation of a

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<sup>47</sup> United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, February 3, 2011, 7.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 37.

suspected terrorist and the detailee did not want to violate Hasan's career by being too intrusive.<sup>52</sup>

The Washington, D.C. JTTF responded to the San Diego Joint Task Force accordingly.

However, the San Diego JTTF was disappointed with the level of detail in the investigation and raised concern about the investigation. Regardless of a few inquiries back to the Washington JTTF, follow-up in the investigation was not completed. Furthermore, neither the San Diego JTTF nor the Washington, D.C. JTTF realized there were additional communications between Hasan and the suspected terrorist.<sup>53</sup> At no time during the investigation did the Federal Bureau of Investigation turn information over to a counterintelligence agency within its own organization or the Department of Defense.

According to the special report of the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, two witnesses interviewed believed, "MAJ Hasan's public displays of radicalization toward violent Islamist extremism during his medical residency and post-residency fellowship were clear, and led two officers to describe him as a "ticking time bomb.""<sup>54</sup> From 2003 to 2009, witnesses reported Hasan expressing in class many of the principles of violent Islamist extremism, as well as in Hasan's written academic papers.<sup>55</sup> During Hasan's last month of residency, he presented a lecture on violent Islamist extremism to fulfill an academic requirement to make a scholarly presentation on psychiatric issues.<sup>56</sup> After this presentation, Hasan made two more "off-topic presentations on violent Islamist extremist topics instead of medical subjects," twice justified suicide bombing in class, suggested that Osama bin Laden's actions may be justified, stated that his religion took precedence over his military oath, and three times in writing stated that Muslim-Americans in the military would be prone to

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 28.

fratricide.<sup>57</sup> Hasan was not referred to counterintelligence officials, disciplined, and/or discharged for displays of radicalization to violent Islamist extremism. More importantly, information held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or the Department of Defense was not shared between the two. Reflecting on the past is not always a fair assessment of the situation; however, in the Hasan case, both agencies had information that articulated an alternate perspective on Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan.

Part of creating a culture of information sharing involves changing the way people value information sharing and collaboration by encouraging behaviors that foster sharing and discouraging those that do not.<sup>58</sup> The government's response was the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) framework that creates critical linkages between four strategic goals: (1) Create a Culture of Sharing; (2) Reduce Barriers to Sharing; (3) Improve Sharing Practices with Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Foreign Partners; and (4) Institutionalize Sharing.<sup>59</sup>

In September 2007, the Director of the National Intelligence created a 100-day plan to accelerate integration and collaboration. The report states that “few transformation efforts have been successful when they did not address culture, attitudes, and day-to-day behaviors. To address these cultural issues, we must integrate the intelligence personnel practices and create a culture of collaboration.”<sup>60</sup> One of the initiatives to change the day-to-day behaviors was “to change classification rules and program management behaviors that have accumulated over more than half a century.” In coordination with the program managers for the Information Sharing Environment, the intelligence community needs to create an environment from a “need to know”

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>58</sup> Information Sharing Environment (Washington, D.C.: Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 2010), xix.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>60</sup> 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007), 2.

to a “responsibility to provide” culture and mindset among our collectors and analysts.<sup>61</sup> In order to change the organizational culture basic assumptions, the classification rules and standards to include “changes to cultural behaviors that lead to thinking of oneself as a ‘data owner’ over information, thereby inhibiting sharing.”<sup>62</sup>

The intelligence community’s objective is to provide seamless information transmission across and within the community while protecting sensitive information. The United States Intelligence Community’s 100-Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration, Focus Area 5: Accelerate Information Sharing states, “The intent is to shift from the current ‘need to know’ mindset to create appropriate tension in the system to more effectively balance the “responsibility to provide” while still addressing the requisite need to protect sources and methods.”<sup>63</sup> The objective of providing seamless information transmission supports program managers of the Information Sharing Environment, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security efforts to share with state, local, tribal, and private sector entities.

An example of how to obtain seamless information transmission is the establishment of fusion centers. The most widely known fusion center is National Counterterrorism Center. Established in 2004 under the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Counterterrorism Center consists of employees from the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. Capitol Hill Police. “The Center provides a unique environment to optimize the United States Government’s collective knowledge and formidable capabilities to

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

identify and counter the terrorist threat to the nation.”<sup>64</sup> At the state level, federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have worked collaboratively to detect and prevent terrorism-related and other types of criminal activity. The collaborative effort takes place through state fusion centers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation sponsored JTTFs. Fusion centers are an attempt to change the culture by demonstrating a willingness to share information among agencies and across all levels of government.

## **Department of Homeland Security’s Organizational Culture**

The agencies and departments that were consolidated and organized under the Department of Homeland Security brought their own cultures to the organization. The members of those organizations have their own subculture within the Department of Homeland Security. The struggle for the Department of Homeland Security is to create its own organizational culture. It has yet to establish a distinct culture of its own.


The history of the Department of Homeland security is important because it describes a large, complex, and developing organizational culture. The Department of Homeland Security was formed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The Department of Homeland Security’s missions are to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce and administer our immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace, and ensure resilience to disasters. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s website, the organizational values are integrity, respect, customer service, continuous improvement and learning, and leadership.

The Department became the third-largest Federal department with over 230,000 employees, merging twenty-two different Federal agencies, each with a separate role in the

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<sup>64</sup> Special Agent Chase H. Boardman, “Organizational Culture Challenges to Interagency Intelligence Community Communication and Interaction” (Norfolk: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006), 38.

mission.<sup>65</sup> The Department of Homeland Security blends these twenty-two agencies consisting of whole departments or pieces of departments bringing with them their own distinct organizational cultures. The agencies came from the Departments of Treasury, Justice, Energy, Defense, Transportation, Agriculture, Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service. As an example, the U.S. Customs Service, a Bureau of the Department of Treasury, was reorganized under the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Department of Homeland Security underwent reorganization in 2005, and is now structured with several directorates and seven primary agencies. In order to better understand the how the Department of Homeland Security evolved, a series of organizational charts reflect the organization's history.



**Figure 2 reflects the departments and agencies involved in Homeland Security prior to the reorganization.<sup>66</sup>**

Figure 2 reflects the departments and agencies involved in Homeland Security prior to the reorganization. These departments and agencies had a stable membership and a shared

<sup>65</sup>The Department of Homeland Security. [www.dhs.gov](http://www.dhs.gov) (accessed November 2, 2010).

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

history of learning and; therefore, have developed their own organizational cultures. As part of the reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security, the departments and agencies brought with them their own organizational cultures. The organizational cultures within the departments and agencies creates subcultures within the Department of Homeland security's current organizational structure.

As an example, prior to 9/11 when a ship entered a U.S. port, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and others had overlapping jurisdictions over pieces of the arriving ship. The goods aboard the ship were regulated by Customs. The people on the ship were covered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The ship was under jurisdictional control of the Coast Guard while at sea and in some cases the Department of Agriculture had jurisdiction over certain cargoes. The Coast Guard did have the authority to act as an agent for the other organizations and assert jurisdiction over the entire vessel. Each of the organizations collected data in their jurisdictional lane, but no single government entity existed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all incoming intelligence information and other key data regarding terrorism in the United States.<sup>67</sup> By consolidating these organizations underneath one umbrella, information within the organization should have become seamless because all now had a leader with a common mission and vision. However, the Department of Homeland Security lacked the essential intelligence resources.


Figure 3 illustrates how the Department of Homeland Security was configured in March 2003. President Bush's vision for Department of Homeland Security was to merge "under one roof the capability to identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland, map those threats against our current vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, and immediately take or effect appropriate preventive and protective action."<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> President George W. Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, 2002, 5.

<sup>68</sup> President George W. Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, 2002, 14.





**Figure 3. Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart, March 2003<sup>69</sup>**

President Bush believed that this big-picture view would be more likely to spot trends and would be able to direct resources to help thwart a terrorist attack.<sup>70</sup> However, the Department of Homeland Security did not have a robust intelligence or law enforcement capability and was dependent upon other agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation remained under the Department of Justice, and its Office of Intelligence was an important partner with the Department of Homeland Security. The new Federal Bureau of Investigation reforms provided critical analysis and information to Department of Homeland Security.<sup>71</sup> The Department of Homeland Security had to rely on the Federal Bureau of Investigations for information; therefore, seamless information sharing between the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigations was vital for the success of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct its legally mandated mission.

<sup>69</sup> The Department of Homeland Security. [www.dhs.gov](http://www.dhs.gov) (accessed November 2, 2010).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 3.

One of the main functions of the Department of Homeland security is to collect and analyze intelligence and other information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources to include the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Energy, Customs, Department of Transportation, and state and local organizations. Charles Perrow, a Professor of Sociology at Yale University states, “It is still not clear as yet what the reorganization means to the agencies that were moved, except that they are expected to take on new duties or increase their security efforts. In many cases it may only mean a change in the letterhead, while personnel continue to use their contacts with other agencies and go about their business.”<sup>72</sup> The purpose of the reorganization was to create an organization that had the ability to look across agencies to detect, identify, understand, and assess terrorist’s threats and ensure protection of the United States. However, the Department of Homeland Security was dependent upon the practice of information sharing of other organizations, as well as their own internal departments and agencies.

Figure 4 reflects the current organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security.<sup>73</sup> In July 2005, the Department of Homeland Security developed policies, operations, and structures to effectively realign its departments to best address the potential threats both present and future that faced our nation.<sup>74</sup> A key element to the development of the organization was to strengthen intelligence functions and information sharing. A new Office of Intelligence and Analysis was created to ensure that information is gathered from all relevant field operations and other parts of the intelligence community and enhance the sharing of information between federal, state, and local government agencies, and the private sector.<sup>75</sup> The Department of

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
<sup>72</sup> Charles Perrow, “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Reorganization” (Homeland Security Affairs, 2006), 13.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

Homeland Security has enhanced its ability to detect, identify, understand, and assess terrorist threats to and vulnerabilities of the homeland to better protect our nation's critical infrastructure, integrate our emergency response networks, and link local state and federal governments.<sup>76</sup>



**Figure 4. Current Organizational Chart of the Department of Homeland Security<sup>77</sup>**

The Department of Homeland Security directorates and agencies perform some degree of intelligence function and require substantial amounts of intelligence from other agencies under the Director of National Intelligence, but external to Department of Homeland Security. Information sharing internal and external to the Department of Homeland Security with the intelligence community is vital to success of the organization's mission to protect the United States without information sharing the Department of Homeland Security is unable to get a clear picture of the threat.

<sup>76</sup> Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 20 January 2010.

<sup>77</sup> Department of Homeland Security, [www.dhs.gov](http://www.dhs.gov) (accessed January 2, 2011).

The Homeland Security Act, enacted in November 2002, charged the Department of Homeland Security with the mission to access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such information in order to detect, identify, understand, and assess terrorists threats and ensure protection of the United States.<sup>78</sup>

However, there was apparently considerable concern that the Department of Homeland Security, as a new agency and not a longtime member of the Intelligence Community, would not be the best place for the integration of highly sensitive information from multiple government agencies.<sup>79</sup> The Department of Homeland Security brought together a number of agencies that were, by and large, law enforcement focused. However, with the exception of the Coast Guard, none of the agencies rolled into the Department of Homeland Security were members of the Intelligence Community.<sup>80</sup>

Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security does not manage the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, Department of Homeland Security did get assurances a “few Department of Homeland Security members could sit in on the coordinating committees in the intelligence community.”<sup>81</sup> The Department of Homeland Security can ask for information, but has no assurance it will get it; intelligence is critical for security, for deciding where to put resources, what kind of threat is likely, for alerts that one is imminent, for knowledge of the

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Special Agent Chase H. Boardman, *Organizational Culture Challenges to Interagency Intelligence Community Communication and Interaction*. (Norfolk: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006), 26.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Charles Perrow, “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Reorganization” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 2006, 22.

strengths and weaknesses of terrorist groups.<sup>82</sup> The Department of Homeland Security is almost totally dependent upon the fragmented intelligence community.”<sup>83</sup>

Even though the Department of Homeland Security was a consumer of intelligence, it had relatively little experience in knowing the idiosyncrasies within the intelligence community. In order to overcome this lack of experience, it was required that members network to gain experience, and this process can only be overcome with time.<sup>84</sup> The intelligence gathering and analysis functions needed for conduct of the security and operations of the U.S. Government remained with the agencies in which they were located prior to the reorganization.<sup>85</sup> The Department of Defense maintained approximately eighty percent of the intelligence community.<sup>86</sup> Most terrorism related intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination continue to reside with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.<sup>87</sup> The Department of Homeland Security started out with only half the tools it needed to conduct its mission.<sup>88</sup> The bottom line is the Department of Homeland Security, being the third largest federal agency, still had to rely on outside organizations to share information to be able to perform its primary mission to protect the United States.

In 2003, President Bush instructed “the leaders of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.”<sup>89</sup> The Director of National Intelligence established the Terrorist Threat

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2003.

Integration Center even though the Department of Homeland Security had the statutory responsibilities for threat integration. There were some concerns raised by Congress about the roles of the Department of Homeland Security intelligence analysis office and Terrorist Threat Integration Center as it appeared that both organizations were required to perform the same mission. The Department of Homeland Security was to be a partner with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, serving as a bridge between the national intelligence community and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that had never been components of the national intelligence community.<sup>90</sup> The Department of Homeland Security partners at state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector gather information outside the boundaries of the intelligence community. Simultaneously, their information needs are not always recognized by traditional intelligence community's agencies. To meet their own all-threats, all-hazards information needs, many states and larger cities have created fusion centers, which provide state and local officials with situational awareness.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013

Strategic Objective 5.2 is to advance intelligence and information sharing. The objective states,

“As we advance information sharing partnerships, we will collaborate closely and work to identify and minimize barriers to sharing information among Federal, State, local, tribal, international, and private and non-profit sector security partners. We will ensure that our domestic and international partners receive needed risk information and share their information with the Federal Government. We will continuously assess our work to enhance our performance in sharing and analyzing intelligence and information.”<sup>91</sup>

The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the capacity of Chief Intelligence Officer integrates the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence components and functions with a common intelligence mission. The intelligence elements are U.S. Citizenship and

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<sup>90</sup> National Counter Terrorism Commission, *NCTC Report*, 3.

<sup>91</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-1013*, 23.

Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Transportation Security Administration. The intelligence elements guide the intelligence community's key principle to change the intelligence culture from "need to know" to "responsibility to provide."<sup>92</sup>

The Department of Homeland Security lacks several key characteristics in building an organizational culture such as a stable membership and a shared history. The lack of a distinct organizational culture does not allow for a basic sense of identity.<sup>93</sup> An organizational culture is needed to provide its members with a common mission and values. Under the current organizational structure, each of the agencies has its own set of values and mission statements that do not align directly with the Department of Homeland Security's values and mission statement. For example, the Transportation Security Administration's website states that its values are integrity, innovation, and team spirit. The Transportation Security Administration's mission is "protects the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce."<sup>94</sup> The organizational value and mission statements of the different agencies are not nested with the Department of Homeland Security's value and mission statement.

The Department of Homeland Security has taken on an enormous mission to consolidate and organize the third-largest Federal department. In the short time the Department of Homeland Security has been established, there has been one internal re-organization to better align its mission and agencies. A Department of Homeland Security member who has been with the organization from its creation described the process as starting from "ground zero;" "there were no identification badges, human resources, systems in place, but we were expected to 'keep the

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<sup>92</sup> Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

<sup>93</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 29.

<sup>94</sup> The Transportation Security Agency. [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov) (accessed March 16, 2011).

country safe from more acts of terrorism.”<sup>95</sup> The Department of Homeland Security did not exist and “then a day went by and we were expected to exist.”<sup>96</sup> The intelligence structure had to be started from the ground up.

The Department of Homeland Security has the legal authority to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all incoming intelligence information and other key data regarding terrorism in the United States.<sup>97</sup> However, the Department of Homeland Security lacks credibility in the intelligence community, so its authority was subjugated by the creation of the Terrorist Threat Center, an environment in which they are only allowed peripheral involvement. In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security took steps to establish credibility by creating the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. According to one Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent supervisor with fourteen years in the organization, the Department of Homeland Security has “come a long way and has built some momentum because of good people running the organization.”<sup>98</sup>

The Department of Homeland Security is a newly established organization that has yet to establish a distinct organizational culture. A Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent supervisor with over thirteen years experience describes the challenge the Department of Homeland Security faces as being new to the game. The Department of Homeland Security is not a master of anything. The agent believes it was a mistake to put all of the agencies and departments under one umbrella.<sup>99</sup> An example given was the Transportation Security

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<sup>95</sup> Department of Homeland Security Interview 1, Virginia L. Egli. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. January 20, 2011.

<sup>96</sup> Department of Homeland Security Interview 2, Virginia L. Egli. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. February 8, 2011.

<sup>97</sup> National Counter Terrorism Commission, *NCTC Report*, 3.

<sup>98</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent 1, Virginia L. Egli. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. December 28, 2010.

<sup>99</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent 2, Virginia L. Egli. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. January 2, 2011.



Administration as an organization not viewed in a positive manner by the public because of the recent airport x-ray reaction, which reflects poorly on the Department of Homeland Security.

The Department of Homeland Security organizational culture has limited impact on information sharing because it has yet to establish a distinct culture of its own. It is difficult to identify key characteristics or distinguish artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions because many of its members continue with their original cultures creating subcultures within the Department of Homeland Security. The subcultures within Department of Homeland Security continue to share information with other agencies in the same manner as prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security is a newly reorganized organization with multiple agencies and departments with diverse missions. The creation of a unified organizational culture within the Department of Homeland Security is going to take time to develop because of the magnitude in size and complexity of the organization.

## **Federal Bureau of Investigation's Organizational Culture**

On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker entered the deployment center at Fort Hood, Texas. Thirteen Department of Defense employees were killed and another thirty-two were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001.<sup>100</sup> Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. citizen is the suspected terrorist. A special report on the Fort Hood shooting by the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's transformation to become intelligence-driven is still incomplete and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation faces internal challenges which may include cultural barriers frustrate on-going institutional reforms.<sup>101</sup> The Federal

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<sup>100</sup> United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, "A Ticking Time Bomb," February 3, 2011.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 9.

Bureau of Investigation did not want to share its information in this case because of law enforcement sensitivities.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation originated from a force of special agents created in 1908 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. The Department of Justice created a corps of special agents. These former detectives and Secret Service men were the forerunners of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.<sup>102</sup> From 1908 until September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was a law enforcement-centric organization. After the events of 9/11, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller changed the organization's focus from law enforcement to intelligence because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was primarily focused on investigating crimes after the fact.<sup>103</sup> Leaders are the main architects of culture; after culture is formed, they influence what kind of leadership is possible; if elements of culture become dysfunctional, leadership can and must do something to speed up culture change.<sup>104</sup> Director Mueller, "appointed just prior to 9/11, and by all accounts more motivated and effective than any of his recent predecessors, can testify that changing an organization's "culture" is a tough job."<sup>105</sup> In December 2001, Director Mueller undertook a broad reorganization to reduce span of control and increase accountability and oversight.<sup>106</sup>

As a threat-based and intelligence-driven national security organization, the mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international

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<sup>102</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation, [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov) (accessed October 8, 2010)

<sup>103</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, "Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Progress and Challenges" (2005), iii.

<sup>104</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, xi.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>106</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, *Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Integrating Management Functions under a Chief Management Officer* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 15.


agencies and partners.<sup>107</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation produces and uses intelligence to protect the nation from threats and to bring to justice those who violate the law. However, of the ten priorities, the first priority is protecting the United States from terrorist attack and the ninth is support to federal, state, local and international partners. There appears to be a disconnect between the first priority of protecting the against terrorist attacks and the support to the federal, state, local, and international partners, which correlates to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's number one priority of protecting against terrorist attacks. The information held within other federal, state, local, and international partners is pertinent, just as much as the information the Federal Bureau of Investigation retains within its own organization.

In July 25, 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation underwent an organizational change to respond better to terrorist threats. Part of the reason for the organizational change was to share information with the Department of Homeland Security. Figure 4 shows the Federal Bureau of Investigation Organizational chart as of July 26, 2006.<sup>108</sup> The boxes with triangles are the new divisions, branches and positions. The boxes with stars display a change in the reporting structure.

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<sup>107</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation website

<sup>108</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, *Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Integrating Management Functions under a Chief Management Officer* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 19.



**Figure 4. Federal Bureau of Investigation Current Organizational Chart<sup>109</sup>**

The 9/11 Commission Report is clear that the overly decentralized Federal Bureau of Investigation needs major attention.<sup>110</sup> According to Charles Perrow, the decentralization of the organization has caused a strong culture and incentive structure that pushes it to consider drug arrests more significant than terrorist arrests. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had a culture of not sharing information which was exacerbated by the "misinterpretation" of judicial rulings and procedures established in 1995. The Third Agency Rule states, "information obtained from a second agency may not be shared with a third agency unless or until cleared by the originating

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>110</sup> Charles Perrow, "Organizational or Executive Failures?" *Contemporary Sociology*, 2005, 2.

agency.”<sup>111</sup> The rule presents a barrier to effective intelligence sharing. To surmount these barriers, “the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 weakened legal barriers to information and intelligence sharing among intelligence and law enforcement agencies.”<sup>112</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation conveniently saw them as prohibiting the sharing of information.<sup>113</sup>

In interpreting the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s organizational culture one must look at the leadership, key characteristics and levels of culture. The key characteristics are structural stability, depth, breadth, and integration or patterning “social learning” through survival, growth and adaptation. The levels of culture are artifacts, espoused values and basic assumptions.

The leadership of the under Director Robert Mueller has been a challenge for agents and refreshing for analysts. Under an intelligence organization, the focus has changed to a more collaborative relationship between agents and intelligence analysts. In several interviews with agents and analysts, there appears to be a distinct subculture to the organization. The agents interviewed clearly disagreed with how the Director was handling the agency. Their comments focused on the Director’s lack of law enforcement background and inability to understand the organization. There appeared to be a lack of respect for the leadership in Washington, D.C. by the field offices due to a lack of understanding of what it was like to be on the ground working the cases. Conversely, the intelligence analysts agreed with the direction the agency was going and agreed with how Director Mueller was responding to a more collaborative and integrated approach between agents and analysts. Using this approach, the analysts sent information requests with the agents in order to create a strategic intelligence picture. In some cases, when an

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<sup>111</sup> Special Agent Chase H. Boardman, *Organizational Culture Challenges to Interagency Intelligence Community Communication and Interaction*. (Norfolk: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006), 12.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Charles Perrow, “The Disaster After 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Reorganization” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 2006, 6.

agent was working a case, the information that was requested by an agent rather than an analyst processing information for a “case.”

Even though there has been some disagreement on the direction in which Director Mueller is taking the agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been in existence since 1908 and has a high degree of structural stability. There are members with a long history in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Those agents and analysts interviewed for this monograph were with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ranging from 13 to 24 years, had a deep understanding of, and pride in the organization. The culture of service to the public permeates the organization.

All of those interviewed agree that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a learning organization. Many felt that the organization needed to adapt and change with the environment in order to stay relevant. In 2003, the survival of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at stake as the 9/11 Commission Report suggested that Bureau be assumed under the Department of Homeland Security. However, it remained an independent agency and needs to continually prove that it is adaptive to the changing environment in order to survive. Director Mueller has the vision to see that without relevancy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is at risk. The transition to an intelligence-centric organization has not come to fruition, but through the guidance of Director Mueller, the organization continues to improve upon its deeply entrenched organizational culture of a law enforcement-centric organization. The National Counterterrorism Center report states, “Although significant efforts have been made to remove the “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence, there may be residual barriers especially those resulting from separate bureaucratic cultures.”<sup>114</sup>

The basic artifacts are the visual organizational structures and processes of an organization; some of those that describe the Federal Bureau of Investigation are described in this section. In interviews with employees within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau has

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<sup>114</sup> National Counter Terrorism Commission, *NCTC Report*, 9.

a level of mystique with the public, which, in some cases, is perceived as a bit of “paranoia.” The public’s understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not have the manpower to watch over 300 million people in the United States with only 12,000 agents nor the constitutional right to do so. In one instance, a neighbor wanted to discuss “his file” with the agent – the neighbor believed everyone had a file.

There are no distinguishing features to the physical environment of the offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, there is a law enforcement language and Federal Bureau of Investigation “lingo.” An example of a lingo is the word “pony.” A pony is a finished product that someone can use as an example. An acronym that is used outside the Federal Bureau of Investigation is SAC; however, in the Federal Bureau of Investigation the term SAC is not used but Special Agent in Charge is the term used. Another media induced visualization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation agent is suit, tie, and sunglasses. The dress code of the Federal Bureau of Investigation varies in each field office and is dependent on the leadership within that office. Generally speaking, the rule is, if the agent is off site, the agent is to be in coat and tie; otherwise, business casual is the appropriate attire.

The following list of artifacts includes values and promotion system. The published list of values includes integrity, bravery, and fidelity. The analyst in the Federal Bureau of Investigation follows the same federal general schedule for hiring and promotion. Upon entry into the Federal Bureau of Investigation, agents start at a GS10 and, within five years, automatically make GS13 without an interview process or going to another job.

There are several espoused values of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The published core values are rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States, respect for the dignity of all those we protect, compassion, fairness, uncompromising personal integrity and institutional integrity, accountability by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions and the consequences of our actions and decisions, and leadership, both personal and professional. Several agents interviewed articulated the importance of “not embarrassing the bureau.” When a

new agent enters the Federal Bureau of Investigation the agent has formal training but no on the job experience. Each field office has their own way of “doing business.”

There are many basic assumptions in the Federal Bureau of Investigations. The focus will be on training and management. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is developing career tracks for agents to specialize in counterterrorism/ counterintelligence, cyber crimes, criminal investigations, or intelligence.<sup>115</sup> A certification process is established to certify agents as intelligence officer. The certification is a prerequisite for promotion to the senior ranks of the Bureau. A training program has been instituted for intelligence-related subjects that aims to shift its focus from reactive criminal investigation to proactive intelligence and counterterrorism.<sup>116</sup>

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is differentiating between traditional criminal investigations and terrorist prevention. The paragraph below is an example of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s long-standing basic assumption of traditional criminal investigations. The traditional investigation is the way in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted business. The organization’s activities revolved around law enforcement investigative activities. A report by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration states,

Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and managers long have measured their success on arrests, prosecutions, and convictions, standard benchmarks for law enforcement investigative activities. These traditional measures are largely irrelevant to the prevention mission in terrorism and other areas of national security. The new paradigm places priority on intelligence information collection and analysis, not prosecution. Indeed, prevention may compromise prosecution and conviction in some cases. Investigators may undertake covert activity to provide the best source of information about attacks or other actions; prosecution in such cases may have to be foregone in favor of the greater goal of prevention. Occasionally, that activity may provide the essential information that ultimately enables prosecution of a larger target transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, “Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Progress and Challenges” (2005), 14.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.



Because the Federal Bureau of Investigation's activities revolved around law enforcement activities, agents were the central focus of the organization. The management has shifted its hiring practices to include employing non-agent personnel with specialized skills such as analysts, linguists, technical experts, and surveillance specialists. Agents are also required to obtain new skills in intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has hired agents with backgrounds in accounting and finance to meet the demands of white collar crime.<sup>118</sup> The hiring practices to seek agents with the skills and experience appropriate to meet the demands of intelligence are under review. There is a new level of collaboration within the organization between non-agents and agents under review.

The changes require a substantial adjustment in organizational culture and personal values.<sup>119</sup> The field agents must become part of a larger institution in which they play a major role, but the success of the organization is dependent upon collaboration and cooperation.<sup>120</sup> The National Academy of Public Administration panel focused on the transformation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is concentrating on the importance of information sharing and changing how the organization views information. There is an emphasis on information sharing as the Federal Bureau of Investigation transforms itself and becomes the lead domestic agency in preventing terrorism and performing other national security functions, retaining its preeminence in criminal law enforcement.<sup>121</sup> The change in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's culture is to shift from the "agent's traditional values of independence, determination, strong camaraderie, and professionalism to ones of joint collaboration, interagency cooperation, and information sharing."<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 12.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's development of a career track for intelligence analysts is a step in the right direction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established expanded intelligence training programs in counterterrorism, intelligence analysis, and security and has continued to reach outside the organization for critical skills.<sup>123</sup>

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's "cultural aversion to technology" may be a legacy. Increased integration of technology into Federal Bureau of Investigation work processes is critical, for both case management and support services. The new hires are younger agents, analysts, and support staff that are better prepared to adopt and utilize information technology in their work.<sup>124</sup>

The National Academy of Public Administration panel discovered that there is a difference in the way agents and analysts view information. The culture emphasizes "the priorities and morale of its criminal components based on cooperation and the free flow of information internally."<sup>125</sup> However, this is contrary to the "compartmentalized characteristics of intelligence that often involve highly sensitive, classified national security information."<sup>126</sup>

The National Academy of Public Administration panel interviewed employees and headquarters and found that the employees were concerned with an organizational culture that values "input from special agents over other employees and an insistence on doing it the Bureau way."<sup>127</sup> The study concluded that management and administration were dominated by an investigative, oriented, crime fighting culture; and concluded that "there is a real need for greater

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 74.

focus on management issues and strategic or long-term thinking in the Federal Bureau of Investigation today.”<sup>128</sup>

Another concern was that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not have a centralized training program. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has multiple divisions, sections, and units with responsibility for creating, offering, and purchasing training this fragmented approach is inefficient.<sup>129</sup> There is no single point of responsibility for workforce training and no comprehensive system to track and measure the development of employee skills or the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s investment in training.<sup>130</sup>

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a history of not sharing information with other federal agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has recognized the lack of collaboration and taken action to rectify this shortcoming through a change in organizational culture. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is currently transforming its training and management to include hiring practices that focus on intelligence skills. However, the organization has a long history of law enforcement responsibilities and still maintains those responsibilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has an opportunity to demonstrate a joint collaboration, interagency cooperation, and information sharing relationship with the Department of Homeland Security.

## **Comparing Organizational Cultures**

The one similarity between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security is their mission to protect and defend the United States against terrorists. The Department of Homeland Security is to conduct comprehensive analysis of all incoming intelligence information and other key data regarding terrorism in the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Director Robert Mueller has changed the organization’s focus from law

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>129</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, “Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Integration Management Functions Under a Chief Management Officer,” 4.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

enforcement to intelligence as a means of preventing terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security's organizational culture has inhibited their efforts in establishing themselves in the intelligence community because the organization is newly organized and analysts are under resourced and have limited experience. Whereas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has an established relationship with the intelligence community and the paradigm shift from law enforcement to intelligence focus is internal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's organizational culture.

A report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration states, "while Department of Homeland Security is assigned authority to do threat assessments, the current administrative reality militates against the Department of Homeland Security performing them."<sup>131</sup> The Department of Homeland Security has not developed the intelligence capacity to perform the threat assessment function.<sup>132</sup> However, the entire current intelligence structure is at odds with the statutory language providing authority to Department of Homeland Security to do domestic threat assessments.<sup>133</sup>

Given the current structure, the intelligence community, not Department of Homeland Security, is in the best position to determine the threat "from abroad" to United States interests, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is specifically assigned responsibility to assess and communicate threats based in the United States and has the capability to do so now.<sup>134</sup>

The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have an opportunity to bridge the information sharing gap through the development of joint threat assessments. The Department of Homeland Security performs critical threat assessment roles both as a member of the intelligence community and in particularizing threats as they impact

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<sup>131</sup> National Academy of Public Administration, "Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Progress and Challenges," 67.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

federal, state, private, and local sectors.<sup>135</sup> An example given from the National Academy of Public Administration in the case of aviation, “the intelligence community would identify threats emanating from abroad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would identify threats based in the United States, while the Department of Homeland Security specified those threats in terms of the risk posed to civil, cargo, private aviation or air facilities.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation has experience in developing threat assessments and the Department of Homeland Security is required to produce threat assessments. With inadequate staffing of analytical positions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security can pool resources.<sup>136</sup>

A prevention focused mission is integral in transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation from law enforcement to intelligence focused organization. A way of developing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s new mission is to learn from “external sources about threats and uncovering those threats by actively targeting potential terrorists are fundamental.”<sup>137</sup> However, it is imperative to cooperate and collaborate with other entities, such as the “United States foreign intelligence community, foreign law enforcement organizations, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement entities.”<sup>138</sup> The Department of Homeland Security, over the course of the last several years, has been building a relationship with state and local law enforcement entities. In collaboration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security are working toward the same mission of keeping the United States secure.

The National Academy of Public Administration panel states, “The Federal Bureau of Investigation shares responsibility with Department of Homeland Security for communicating threat information to state and local officials. The Department of Homeland Security

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

communicates threat information to state and local officials, except law enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation communicates threat information only to law enforcement officials.”<sup>139</sup> However, this shared responsibility has caused “confusion and consternation at the state and local level, especially for law enforcement which receives threat information both from the Federal Bureau of Investigation directly and Department of Homeland Security indirectly through government leaders.”<sup>140</sup> In some cases the information is conflicting or “the same information communicated by different sources at different times, can lead to confusion over the nature of the threat or the response.”<sup>141</sup>

The primary organizational culture difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security is stable membership and shared history. Stability in organizational culture means that its members are firmly established. Shared history in organizational culture means that its members have gone through the social learning and/or socialization process while overcoming challenges events.

The Department of Homeland Security has not established a firm stable membership because of two reorganizations since 2003, magnitude in size and complexity of the organization. The Department of Homeland Security established in 2003 has over 230,000 employees, merging twenty-two different Federal agencies, each with a separate role in the mission. The Department of Homeland Security subcultures have shared history because several of the agencies that were reconfigured into the Department of Homeland Security were well established and shared history.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has over 33,000 employees with five functional branches.<sup>142</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been in existence since 1908 and has a high degree of structural stability. There are members with a long history in the Federal Bureau of

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation website

Investigation. Those agents and analysts interviewed for this monograph were with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ranging from 13 to 24 years, had a deep understanding of, and pride in the organization. The culture of service to the public permeates the organization.

The Department of Homeland Security is at a disadvantage compared to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Information sharing is critical to the mission the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a well established organizational culture and a long-standing member of the intelligence community. The Department of Homeland Security has not yet established an organizational culture and has limited credibility in the intelligence community. The Department of Homeland Security must identify, understand and work through the barriers of organizational cultures within the intelligence community.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

In an interview, Edgar Schein reiterated that the underlying basic assumption in the intelligence community is that there is a macro culture; however, the agencies within the intelligence community have generated their own organizational cultures regarding the sharing of information. Information is power and it is more often protected than shared.

The Department of Homeland Security has a developing organizational culture. The 2005 reorganization has aligned the Department of Homeland Security in a manner that the independent agencies can receive guidance and leadership from the Secretary's office. The subcultures that are a part of the Department of Homeland Security have survived the reorganization. As the leadership solidifies the mission and values, and hires the experience needed to continue forward, the Department of Homeland Security's organizational culture continues to develop and the subcultures align themselves with the missions and values of the organization.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is managing its own shift in organizational culture, transforming from a law enforcement organization to an intelligence organization. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's leadership has demonstrated an understanding of what it entails to change the organizational culture. However, the Department of Homeland Security is a non-threatening entity that could help facilitate a change in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's transformation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation offers an opportunity to teach and mentor members of the Department of Homeland Security in intelligence functions. Essentially, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security have the same mission. If the organizations shared their resources and pooled their knowledge, information sharing would become more transparent.



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